Explain the difference between an interested liking and a disinterested liking, according to Kant.

Interest, according to Kant, is taken to mean a kind of pleasure that is incited in association with the existence of an object in question. This pleasure translates to something which we like and fancy, and therefore something which we desire. Disinterestedness is a state of condition where one must be wholly indifferent towards a subject matter.

Consequently, Kant alluded to three kinds of liking: the liking for the agreeable, for the good and for the beautiful. He claimed that the likings for the agreeable and for the good are classified under interested liking while liking for the beautiful falls under the category of disinterested liking. A liking for the agreeable is to like or prefer an object that gratifies one’s senses and what makes one feel good. Since every different individual has varying degrees and standards of what makes them feel good, this notion is highly subjective. What one finds agreeable is necessarily what one finds pleasurable; it does not require a standard scale of assessment.

A liking for the good occurs when one likes the object in so far as there is a good reason for it. It can be further split into the two categories of intrinsic and instrumental good. When one likes something as a means to another end in mind, this constitutes an instrumental good. An example would be someone liking a delicious piece of steak because one is feeling ravenous after having starved for days. He may not like the piece of steak for whatever nutritional benefits it may offer, but likes the steak as long as it filled his stomach. When something is liked for an intrinsic good, it is liked as an end in itself. An example would be someone keeping her promise simply because keeping a promise is good in itself.

When it comes to liking for the beautiful, the judgment of what we opine as beautiful is dependant upon taste. Since this assessment of beauty is not about whether anyone cares, but instead about how it is judged by virtue of its own qualities via our unbiased contemplation, it should be made in a state of disinterestedness. Whenever a judgment is made under even the slightest influence of interest, one can hardly claim that it is impartial and just. The judgment of beauty is contingent upon the impartiality of taste under a condition that is devoid of interest; it follows then that this judgment of taste should have a claim to subjective universality. Everyone should have the same common understanding and standards when it comes to assessing and discussing the aspects of what makes something beautiful. However, we must be careful not to succumb to being personally interested in the subject because then, the judgment of taste of the beautiful becomes a judgment of what is good, which is subjective and hardly universal. Therefore in summary, a judgment made in interested liking is subjective and ambiguous while a judgment made in disinterested liking is impartial, fair and ought to be universal in applications.