men, as compared to women, have been hailed the more practical being:
conversation:
her: i guess women tend to like buying things that don't last long and are less practicable.
him: isn't that a waste of money?
her: who needs to buy practical stuffs? we've got men...
talk about practicality eh?
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Explain why Cavell takes agreements or disagreements about aesthetic judgments to matter to us in the way they do.
Cavell seems to suggest that the lack of conclusiveness in matters concerning aesthetic judgments, albeit a widespread and common phenomenon, does not prove itself as an irrationality; he in fact goes to show that this is what precisely is rational about aesthetic judgments and he even goes to say that it is this seemingly “different” kind of rationality that is needed in the area of aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments differ from the likes of empirical mathematical or scientific theories and concepts in that it is normative and encompasses an element of subjectivity. It does not seek to conform the world by advocating universal applicability and consensus. It is also due to this subjectivity that results in the myriad of agreements and disagreements about aesthetic judgments. Hence if a critic were to mete out his judgment of a piece of art work as if he were reading the measurements off a scale, it would be prudent for us to question how is one to know that we ought to place our trust in this particular critic’s judgments and not any other critic’s.
Judgments in matters of art and aesthetics are subjective because there are no hard and fast rules that govern their causality and methods. We do not value critics simply because they are right, but because of their ability to draw our responses to a particular piece of art work. An art critic’s purpose is not to stifle the participation and free play of our cognitive faculties, but instead to arouse our thoughts and focus our attention to the pertinent and valuable aspects of a work of art, by virtue of his expertise and knowledge of this subject area. It is thus possible that this interaction between the freedom of artists to express themselves individually and our willing interpretation, which invites discourse, makes art valuable; maybe it is a good thing to agree to have some form of disagreements about some judgments in life. For the reason that there are no experts in the study of the philosophy of aesthetics in so far as they know it all and are always right, much like moral philosophy, discourse is encouraged just as long as a critic has a capacity to elicit support and agreement with his judgment, and to defend his views in a coherent and objective fashion.
With a sea of subjectivity as backdrop, controversy seems destined to be the bane of a conclusive agreement in aesthetic judgments; even if we were to grant an instance whereby an agreement is reached, the agreement will be fragile and short-lived as the judgment of aesthetics invokes in us a constant desire for interpretation as long as there remains an interest. But where there is an agreement in a world where only subjectivity is guaranteed, it is all the more gratifying and valuable to acknowledge the precious connection and mutual understanding amongst the community of people who agree.
Judgments in matters of art and aesthetics are subjective because there are no hard and fast rules that govern their causality and methods. We do not value critics simply because they are right, but because of their ability to draw our responses to a particular piece of art work. An art critic’s purpose is not to stifle the participation and free play of our cognitive faculties, but instead to arouse our thoughts and focus our attention to the pertinent and valuable aspects of a work of art, by virtue of his expertise and knowledge of this subject area. It is thus possible that this interaction between the freedom of artists to express themselves individually and our willing interpretation, which invites discourse, makes art valuable; maybe it is a good thing to agree to have some form of disagreements about some judgments in life. For the reason that there are no experts in the study of the philosophy of aesthetics in so far as they know it all and are always right, much like moral philosophy, discourse is encouraged just as long as a critic has a capacity to elicit support and agreement with his judgment, and to defend his views in a coherent and objective fashion.
With a sea of subjectivity as backdrop, controversy seems destined to be the bane of a conclusive agreement in aesthetic judgments; even if we were to grant an instance whereby an agreement is reached, the agreement will be fragile and short-lived as the judgment of aesthetics invokes in us a constant desire for interpretation as long as there remains an interest. But where there is an agreement in a world where only subjectivity is guaranteed, it is all the more gratifying and valuable to acknowledge the precious connection and mutual understanding amongst the community of people who agree.
On Kant’s view what are the features of a work of genius? Explain.
In order to better understand and describe the features of a work of genius in accordance with Kant’s view, we need to look at what and who a genius is. Kant’s notion of a genius is someone who has been blessed with an innate talent, which is naturally endowed. It is through this genius whom “nature gives the rule to art,” meaning to say that this innate talent accords him with the ability to produce art that are in accordance to nature’s rules. However, this ability can neither be learnt nor imitated; even these natural rules that govern the genius’ work of art cannot be transmitted, communicated and taught. This seems paradoxical in so far as there is a need for rules and yet the rules are so elusive and exclusive, so much so that the genius seems to be the only person capable of conveying these rules of nature. When a genius dies, this ability dies along with him. There is no way of ensuring the preservation of his skills and abilities through understudy whatsoever. It seems then that we will see the next genius only when nature decides to endow someone else with this talent.
To complicate matters, these “natural rules” are very much unlike the typical rules of science or mathematics. Scientific and mathematical rules are both empirical and observable in nature and can therefore be proven by following an often well-established set of laws. Natural rules on the contrary, are difficult to elucidate. This is to such an extent that even the genius is unable to explain how these original and exemplary ideas are formed in his head in the first place. An example in case is that Newton, who discovered the laws of gravity, is not someone Kant considers a genius despite his intellectual prowess because he is able to clarify and impart his knowledge and thus explain how he arrived at the discoveries. Hence, the primary feature of the work of a genius is that it is original and cannot be imitated.
It thus follows that even the cleverest and brightest of students can never be considered geniuses because what they are essentially doing is learning and imitating. An imitation of a genius’ work, regardless of how similar the works are and how talented the copying artist is, is not considered a work of art of a genius. Other than having to be original, the works of a genius will have to be able to serve as an example that fully reflects the rules that govern it; it cannot be an original piece of random nonsense. His work must also incite the viewers’ imagination and engage them in cognitive thoughts and ideas. In fact, this example is all that another genius has available to him as a model and guide as to what constitutes a genius and to inspire how his works should be like.
To complicate matters, these “natural rules” are very much unlike the typical rules of science or mathematics. Scientific and mathematical rules are both empirical and observable in nature and can therefore be proven by following an often well-established set of laws. Natural rules on the contrary, are difficult to elucidate. This is to such an extent that even the genius is unable to explain how these original and exemplary ideas are formed in his head in the first place. An example in case is that Newton, who discovered the laws of gravity, is not someone Kant considers a genius despite his intellectual prowess because he is able to clarify and impart his knowledge and thus explain how he arrived at the discoveries. Hence, the primary feature of the work of a genius is that it is original and cannot be imitated.
It thus follows that even the cleverest and brightest of students can never be considered geniuses because what they are essentially doing is learning and imitating. An imitation of a genius’ work, regardless of how similar the works are and how talented the copying artist is, is not considered a work of art of a genius. Other than having to be original, the works of a genius will have to be able to serve as an example that fully reflects the rules that govern it; it cannot be an original piece of random nonsense. His work must also incite the viewers’ imagination and engage them in cognitive thoughts and ideas. In fact, this example is all that another genius has available to him as a model and guide as to what constitutes a genius and to inspire how his works should be like.
Explain the difference between an interested liking and a disinterested liking, according to Kant.
Interest, according to Kant, is taken to mean a kind of pleasure that is incited in association with the existence of an object in question. This pleasure translates to something which we like and fancy, and therefore something which we desire. Disinterestedness is a state of condition where one must be wholly indifferent towards a subject matter.
Consequently, Kant alluded to three kinds of liking: the liking for the agreeable, for the good and for the beautiful. He claimed that the likings for the agreeable and for the good are classified under interested liking while liking for the beautiful falls under the category of disinterested liking. A liking for the agreeable is to like or prefer an object that gratifies one’s senses and what makes one feel good. Since every different individual has varying degrees and standards of what makes them feel good, this notion is highly subjective. What one finds agreeable is necessarily what one finds pleasurable; it does not require a standard scale of assessment.
A liking for the good occurs when one likes the object in so far as there is a good reason for it. It can be further split into the two categories of intrinsic and instrumental good. When one likes something as a means to another end in mind, this constitutes an instrumental good. An example would be someone liking a delicious piece of steak because one is feeling ravenous after having starved for days. He may not like the piece of steak for whatever nutritional benefits it may offer, but likes the steak as long as it filled his stomach. When something is liked for an intrinsic good, it is liked as an end in itself. An example would be someone keeping her promise simply because keeping a promise is good in itself.
When it comes to liking for the beautiful, the judgment of what we opine as beautiful is dependant upon taste. Since this assessment of beauty is not about whether anyone cares, but instead about how it is judged by virtue of its own qualities via our unbiased contemplation, it should be made in a state of disinterestedness. Whenever a judgment is made under even the slightest influence of interest, one can hardly claim that it is impartial and just. The judgment of beauty is contingent upon the impartiality of taste under a condition that is devoid of interest; it follows then that this judgment of taste should have a claim to subjective universality. Everyone should have the same common understanding and standards when it comes to assessing and discussing the aspects of what makes something beautiful. However, we must be careful not to succumb to being personally interested in the subject because then, the judgment of taste of the beautiful becomes a judgment of what is good, which is subjective and hardly universal. Therefore in summary, a judgment made in interested liking is subjective and ambiguous while a judgment made in disinterested liking is impartial, fair and ought to be universal in applications.
Consequently, Kant alluded to three kinds of liking: the liking for the agreeable, for the good and for the beautiful. He claimed that the likings for the agreeable and for the good are classified under interested liking while liking for the beautiful falls under the category of disinterested liking. A liking for the agreeable is to like or prefer an object that gratifies one’s senses and what makes one feel good. Since every different individual has varying degrees and standards of what makes them feel good, this notion is highly subjective. What one finds agreeable is necessarily what one finds pleasurable; it does not require a standard scale of assessment.
A liking for the good occurs when one likes the object in so far as there is a good reason for it. It can be further split into the two categories of intrinsic and instrumental good. When one likes something as a means to another end in mind, this constitutes an instrumental good. An example would be someone liking a delicious piece of steak because one is feeling ravenous after having starved for days. He may not like the piece of steak for whatever nutritional benefits it may offer, but likes the steak as long as it filled his stomach. When something is liked for an intrinsic good, it is liked as an end in itself. An example would be someone keeping her promise simply because keeping a promise is good in itself.
When it comes to liking for the beautiful, the judgment of what we opine as beautiful is dependant upon taste. Since this assessment of beauty is not about whether anyone cares, but instead about how it is judged by virtue of its own qualities via our unbiased contemplation, it should be made in a state of disinterestedness. Whenever a judgment is made under even the slightest influence of interest, one can hardly claim that it is impartial and just. The judgment of beauty is contingent upon the impartiality of taste under a condition that is devoid of interest; it follows then that this judgment of taste should have a claim to subjective universality. Everyone should have the same common understanding and standards when it comes to assessing and discussing the aspects of what makes something beautiful. However, we must be careful not to succumb to being personally interested in the subject because then, the judgment of taste of the beautiful becomes a judgment of what is good, which is subjective and hardly universal. Therefore in summary, a judgment made in interested liking is subjective and ambiguous while a judgment made in disinterested liking is impartial, fair and ought to be universal in applications.
On what basis does Hume think there can be better or worse judgments about art? Explain.
Hume thinks that there are five qualities that ought to be possessed by an art critic. 1. The first quality an art critic requires is what Hume termed as ‘delicacy’. A critic must be able to discriminate the fine and intricate details of an art work. Expressed in another way, a critic must exercise finesse when judging and not be affected by just the ‘grosser and more palpable qualities’ of the piece of work. 2. A critic needs to practice often. When he exposes himself to frequent assessment and contemplations of a certain type of beauty in art, the easier and better he will be at discerning them. He gradually becomes more capable of drawing out its merits and defects without making mistakes. As he becomes increasingly experienced, the speed and clarity in which he judges will also increase accordingly and will no longer be as confused as he initially was. 3. In order to practice however, a critic must have access to other art works of various degrees of excellence. They serve their purpose as a form of comparison; only in estimating their qualities relative to each other can there be an opinion or judgment. Therefore a critic improves with the amount of comparing he conducts between art works. 4. The fourth quality that is required of a critic is that he be free from all prejudices. This “neutral” state of being enables him to concentrate only on the object under scrutiny, allowing nothing to come in between them. If any person is influenced by prejudice, he is unable to make a true judgment in accordance with absolute partiality. 5. The last quality a critic must possess is the ability for good sense. In good sense Hume meant that a critic must be able to exercise good reasoning abilities and sound understanding of the subject matter, such that he is able to maintain an overall grasp of the task at hand. This quote from Hume combines and summarises the five above mentioned points: ‘Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character.’ Whenever they are combined, it constitutes ‘the true standard of taste and beauty.’
These qualities are somewhat skills that can somehow be acquired in some way or other and therefore would understandably result in varying degrees in different critics of differing mental aptitudes. Hume accedes that this disparity in judgments about art results from the fact that not all critics, even the best of them, will be able to elicit a universal agreement due to two main reasons. The first results from the difference in the characters of different persons; it can be empathised that a young man would prefer something of a livelier nature as compared to an older man who prefers something wise and more contemplative in nature. The second reason is due to the differing cultural differences; we can hardly send an Asian man who has been brought up accustomed to eating rice as his staple food to assess the taste of meat and potatoes typical of the European diet. Hence a critic who is able to overcome such differences and relate well to the relevant context will be able to make better judgments about art.
These qualities are somewhat skills that can somehow be acquired in some way or other and therefore would understandably result in varying degrees in different critics of differing mental aptitudes. Hume accedes that this disparity in judgments about art results from the fact that not all critics, even the best of them, will be able to elicit a universal agreement due to two main reasons. The first results from the difference in the characters of different persons; it can be empathised that a young man would prefer something of a livelier nature as compared to an older man who prefers something wise and more contemplative in nature. The second reason is due to the differing cultural differences; we can hardly send an Asian man who has been brought up accustomed to eating rice as his staple food to assess the taste of meat and potatoes typical of the European diet. Hence a critic who is able to overcome such differences and relate well to the relevant context will be able to make better judgments about art.
Explain Collingwood’s distinction between art proper and craft.
Collingwood thinks that there is confusion between what people today call art and craft. Through the years, a lot of works have been loosely classified under the category of Art. However, Collingwood seeks to differentiate art proper from crafts by highlighting the six characteristics of what a craft is. 1. Craft necessarily involves actions that are considered means and those that are ends in themselves. By the term “means”, Collingwood seems to describe it as the actions that are involved in a process; it does not apply strictly to the physical objects that are involved in the transformation process. This process or procedure that constitutes the means will cease to exist once the end has been achieved. 2. Craft involves a distinction between planning and execution. A craftsman must already have the end result clearly in mind before he sets off with the production process. This is important because if there were no end result to begin with, the production of the product can be considered nothing more than an accident. 3. In the planning stage, the end result is first thought out before the means are determined; but in the execution stage, the means are accomplished first, before the end materialises. 4. There is a distinct difference between the raw material, which can often be found ready made, and the finished product. 5. The matter is identical in both the raw material and the finished product but the form is different; the process of the craft has transformed it. 6. There are three sorts of hierarchy in a craft: (i) the raw material of one craft is the finished product of another. (ii) The end product of one craft serves as tools for another craft. (iii) Some crafts like car manufacturing involve only assembling the different finished products of different other crafts.
Collingwood thinks that art proper is essentially an expression of emotions, with artists serving to fulfil that function. Art proper is therefore not craft because their characteristics as alluded above are different. Under point 1, an artist’s means and end are not so easily discernable as compared to a craftsman’s; a craftsman’s nuts, bolts and the finished result of an object are clearly distinct and clearly observable while a poet’s penning of a poem on the contrary, seems to blur the lines between the means and the end. The poet also contradicts point 2 of the distinction between planning and execution; he often does not have a clear and pre-conceived idea of the end result in mind before he actually begins his poem, as compared to a carpenter who has the well-conceived idea or decision to make a table that is round for example, has four legs and of a certain size and height that fulfils a specific function before he sets out to begin his production process. A poet only has a general idea to begin with and the end result only gets more defined as he progresses along the production process.
Collingwood thinks that art proper is essentially an expression of emotions, with artists serving to fulfil that function. Art proper is therefore not craft because their characteristics as alluded above are different. Under point 1, an artist’s means and end are not so easily discernable as compared to a craftsman’s; a craftsman’s nuts, bolts and the finished result of an object are clearly distinct and clearly observable while a poet’s penning of a poem on the contrary, seems to blur the lines between the means and the end. The poet also contradicts point 2 of the distinction between planning and execution; he often does not have a clear and pre-conceived idea of the end result in mind before he actually begins his poem, as compared to a carpenter who has the well-conceived idea or decision to make a table that is round for example, has four legs and of a certain size and height that fulfils a specific function before he sets out to begin his production process. A poet only has a general idea to begin with and the end result only gets more defined as he progresses along the production process.
Saturday, September 13, 2008
abortion and infanticide
Q4. Is there a moral difference between abortion and infanticide? Discuss with special reference to the views of Michael Tooley and Mary Anne Warren.
This essay seeks to express my view that there is a moral difference between abortion and some cases of infanticide. An abortion is a termination of a pregnancy; the expulsion of the foetus while it is still in refuge in its mother’s body. I opine that a foetus should not be considered an individual being and therefore aborting it does not make it any more immoral than removing a tumour found in the mother’s body; it is not murder as many have claimed. In fact, I would argue to classify the decision on abortion under an amoral one because a foetus while nested in its mother’s womb does not have the quality that entitles it to the right to life. Infanticide as a whole is prima facie immoral; but there are cases which ought not to be considered immoral and thereby be permitted under these unforeseen circumstances, especially so if they are decided early. This apparent double standard arises primarily from the fact that the foetus has already been born and it is now a separate entity, making it fall into a more complicated category by virtue that it is now a truly viable life form, independent of its mother and quickly capable of relational and social bonding. Infanticide should therefore be morally permissible under these special circumstances which I will attempt to elucidate. For the purpose of the discussion in this essay, a mother is assumed to be a normal, rational woman who harbours the best interest for the foetus and infant.
Many philosophers have attempted to make a distinction between the stages of: conception, the acquiring of human form, sentience, quickening, viability and birth, by attributing specific qualities to the various stages. They have appealed to these unique characteristics in their argument in their quest of ascertaining a cut-off point; an invisible line that can be drawn in which we can safely claim that abortion of a foetus before this point is not morally wrong. Unfortunately they have faced great difficulties as it seems that all the arguments put forward have their associated weaknesses and problems. It seems then that we need something more intrinsic in nature; an attribute that is less arbitrary and one which we can observe and ascertain with greater ease. I appeal to Michael Tooley’s argument that in order to accord something a serious right to life, it has to possess the ability to comprehend the ‘concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believe that it is itself such a continuing entity.’ A foetus therefore does not possess the property that entitles it the serious right to life; an abortion should not be morally wrong.
Mary Anne Warren’s view that the only stage that makes a morally significant difference ought to be at birth, albeit not flawless, appeals to me as the most plausible proposition. I consider a foetus the result of a mere interaction between the spermatozoa and ovum. The various differences associated with the stages of foetal development claimed by these philosophers do not seem to change the fact that a foetus resides in its mother’s womb; it is thence likened to a tumour in a fertile woman’s body and can therefore be expected to be considered nothing more than a new growth of cells until its birth. If the removal of a tumour, whether malignant or benign, requires no moral presupposition and is purely based on the patient’s decision in consultation with her doctor, then a decision to abort or not should similarly not invite any moral discourse. Abortion is amoral.
The most obvious physical aspect we can observe is the very fact that a foetus is nursed and nurtured in its mother’s body. This special and apparently parasitic relationship seems to imply that the foetus is still very much a part of the mother in so far as there is no way to exclude it and to speak of it as a separate entity. The mother cannot voluntarily and willfully choose to pause or terminate the nurturing process without aborting the pregnancy completely. It is this special physical relationship that makes it problematic to accord equal rights to both mother and foetus as two separate entities for the mother’s rights are often at odds with the foetus.’ Take for example a case whereby keeping the foetus endangers the life of the mother. Just as the general intuition of removing a malignant tumour invites no moral controversies, the removal of that very foetus which threatens the life of its mother should be treated likewise. However, if we were to accord the foetus the same kind of right to life as we accord to other human beings, we expose ourselves to the susceptibility of being compelled to preserve the life of the foetus and allow the degeneration of the mother’s health, even if it means that we lose both the mother and the foetus in the process. Even if we were to accede to the highly contestable view of according the foetus a right to life, we must not forget that ‘having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body – even if one needs it for life itself.’ There should never be a question on morality especially when the life of the mother is at stake.
The discussions have thus far been primarily focused on the foetus. We have tried to accord them with pertinent characteristics so as to argue for giving them the right to life. The morality of abortion then stems from whether they qualify for the criteria or not. I urge that we should not forget the role and responsibility of the mother in our discourse because she is very much the main character, even more so than her foetus. Many have failed to recognize that by compelling a woman to carry and nourish a foetus she does not want, constitutes committing a moral wrong to the mother. It is one thing to be constrained by divine restrictions which she has no control over but quite another to be forced by her fellow human beings. Mothers, the de facto primary caregivers, are the closest person to their foetuses. They are most aware of the reality and overall circumstance of their particular predicament. There should be no doubt that they have nothing but the foetus’ best interest at heart and would do nothing morally wrong if they can help it. I am therefore in support of granting the mother of the foetus the strongest vote in the making of decisions regarding the fate of her foetus because she remains the closest link to the foetus as it is after all still part of her. Unless it can be proven that the mother is unfit and incapable of rational and reasonable thought, she remains the best person to decide. Only in cases where a mother is suspected to be irrational, emotionally unstable and lacking in mental capacities should it be intervened on the basis of morality.
Thompson’s claim that a foetus cannot be considered a person right from the onset of conception further reinforces my view that since it is not considered a person, an abortion can hardly be comparable to the generally agreed morally wrong act of murdering a person. Moreover, the notion of abortion being considered murdering an innocent human foetal life is not only culturally generated, but also seems to be more of a construct of the Catholic Church and often with a religious tinge. Such conditions seem to suggest that abortion being thought of as morally wrong is not as pervasive and is not universally accepted amongst all of mankind in all recorded history.
Infants are very much likened to fetuses; in fact, there are no physical and cognitive differences between late-term fetuses except for its physical location. An infant, like a foetus, has no concept of a self as opined by Tooley. If Tooley were right, then an infant has no right to life and killing it is not morally wrong. However, I disagree with this view and argue that an infant must surely be different to a foetus who has until now only managed to survive under the physical protection of its mother. For one, it has shown itself strong enough to survive the delivery and has proven itself to be truly viable in so far as it can consume and breathe on its own. So even though an infant is not yet self-aware, its social and relational aspects are fast developing. While it used to be a relationship between the mother and the foetus, and to a lesser degree its father, an infant now concerns family and friends. The sensory experience of having an individual someone to hold and to love contributes to making an infant more person-like and in my opinion, makes killing it morally wrong.
Contrary to Tooley’s claim that infants probably do not desire to continue to exist, I argue that we can witness the infant’s desire to continue living. While it may be tricky and difficult to observe a foetus’ desire to survive because it exists inside its mother’s body and is nourished primarily via the umbilical cord which it cannot willfully reject the nurturing process, we can easily observe an infant’s will to survive; it cries when it feels hungry and when it is sick. This seems to suggest that they do not feel comfortable and hence dislike that physical state of being. A more extreme thought experiment that does not require actual execution would be to restrict the inhalation of fresh air by the infant but careful not to suffocate it. I am sure that the infant will retaliate in some form or other, attesting to its will to survive. Besides the additional attributes that adds to the strength of qualifying an infant as a person, we should take today’s medical advances and social conditions into context; killing a healthy, viable infant can no longer be claimed that it is done in the infant’s own best interests.’ There even exists plentiful of other options such as adoption by deserving couples who are unable to conceive. Hence infanticide of the above mentioned “normal” kind would be likened to murder and is therefore morally wrong.
In contrast to abortion where I have claimed that it is relatively straight forward, the morality of infanticide does not seem so defined. While infanticide is generally morally wrong, I argue that some cases should be made permissible under special conditions. In cases where the unfortunate foetus is born with severe mental handicaps like anencephaly and Down’s syndrome, where they are unable to appreciate the social and relational aspects which I alluded to earlier in this essay, I find it justifiable to end it of its misery. Try for a moment to appreciate the situation from the point of view of the infant; imagine a life of ostracism and weird stares from insensitive bystanders while growing up, great difficulties in common everyday activities and a burden to its family’s financial well-being. Even if we were to grant that the affected infant were to grow up to be slightly aware despite being severely mentally handicapped, I am of the view that he will agree that living a life as such will never be happier than compared to an average, healthy contemporary. Tooley’s idea of increasing the happiness level of society from discriminate infanticide seems callous at first, but on scrutiny, I believe it can be empathised. It is understandable that the parents find it devastating and will no doubt be burdened by the guilt of having come to such a decision, but I appeal for parents to look beyond the immediate loss and find peace and reassurance in knowing that they have acted in their infant’s best interests, and trust that the infant will be in a better place, living a happier life than a life of disability. So long as the reasons for infanticide are valid and the decision made shortly after birth, infanticide should be morally acceptable.
Parents who are so unfortunate to have to decide to end the life of their infant so shortly after death must surely be aware of the gravity of the situation; that it is a life that they are contemplating to end. Painful and difficult deliberations must have ensued upon the knowledge of such dire disabilities in their beloved infant whom the mother has so painstakingly carried to term for nine months. How then can we, as independent observers, not give them the benefit of the doubt that they are not doing this for fun, and that it affects them in manifold magnitudes? While few would agree that infanticide will be considered the least tragic of all other alternatives against the advances of medical science today, we cannot rule out the possible predicament of people who live in impoverished conditions. In the case where the infant is born in a land plagued by acute famine, infanticide via quick and painless methods would be more moral than allowing the infant to live now and suffer the slow and painful death of hunger. With medical sciences so advanced today, and with all forms of infanticide immoral, there might be a possibility where earth’s resources can no longer cater for and sustain the increase in human population if we were to take things to the extreme. When the rest of the world’s population suffers from inadequate food supplies and malnourishment, the moral wrongness inflicted to the sheer number of people surely outweighs the moral wrongness inflicted upon comparatively smaller numbers of people.
Through this essay, I hope to have expressed my view that there is nothing morally wrong with abortions because the foetus is not human in so far as it does not possess the ability of what Tooley claims it as conceiving of itself as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states. I also appealed to the analogy that a foetus is just like a tumour that resides in its mother’s womb and therefore its removal should not invite any moral controversies; it is amoral. On the other hand, the indiscriminate killing of infants is morally wrong, even though a newly born infant is arguably no different from a foetus except for its location and relational aspects. I find it immoral, on the contrary to abortions, because an infant possesses the capability to bond with more people than just the mother, the additional quality of an infant that surpasses a foetus in the question of morality. Nevertheless, there are some instances where decisions to terminate the life of an infant are morally permissible; these decisions however, should be made soon after birth and only if it serves to reduce the amount of harm and suffering of the infant.
Word count: 2480
Reference:
Michael Tooley, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 37-65
Mary Anne Warren, ‘The Moral Significance of Birth’, Hypatia, vol. 4, no. 3, 1989, pp. 46-65
Judith Jarvis Thompson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (1971). Reprinted in Rachels, Moral Problems, Second Ed., pp. 104-120
Rosalind Petchesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice, (Longman, N.Y. 1984), ch. 9
Lomansky, Loren. ‘Being a Person – does it matter?’, The Problem of Abortion, Joel Feinberg, ed. Belmont, California, 1984
This essay seeks to express my view that there is a moral difference between abortion and some cases of infanticide. An abortion is a termination of a pregnancy; the expulsion of the foetus while it is still in refuge in its mother’s body. I opine that a foetus should not be considered an individual being and therefore aborting it does not make it any more immoral than removing a tumour found in the mother’s body; it is not murder as many have claimed. In fact, I would argue to classify the decision on abortion under an amoral one because a foetus while nested in its mother’s womb does not have the quality that entitles it to the right to life. Infanticide as a whole is prima facie immoral; but there are cases which ought not to be considered immoral and thereby be permitted under these unforeseen circumstances, especially so if they are decided early. This apparent double standard arises primarily from the fact that the foetus has already been born and it is now a separate entity, making it fall into a more complicated category by virtue that it is now a truly viable life form, independent of its mother and quickly capable of relational and social bonding. Infanticide should therefore be morally permissible under these special circumstances which I will attempt to elucidate. For the purpose of the discussion in this essay, a mother is assumed to be a normal, rational woman who harbours the best interest for the foetus and infant.
Many philosophers have attempted to make a distinction between the stages of: conception, the acquiring of human form, sentience, quickening, viability and birth, by attributing specific qualities to the various stages. They have appealed to these unique characteristics in their argument in their quest of ascertaining a cut-off point; an invisible line that can be drawn in which we can safely claim that abortion of a foetus before this point is not morally wrong. Unfortunately they have faced great difficulties as it seems that all the arguments put forward have their associated weaknesses and problems. It seems then that we need something more intrinsic in nature; an attribute that is less arbitrary and one which we can observe and ascertain with greater ease. I appeal to Michael Tooley’s argument that in order to accord something a serious right to life, it has to possess the ability to comprehend the ‘concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believe that it is itself such a continuing entity.’ A foetus therefore does not possess the property that entitles it the serious right to life; an abortion should not be morally wrong.
Mary Anne Warren’s view that the only stage that makes a morally significant difference ought to be at birth, albeit not flawless, appeals to me as the most plausible proposition. I consider a foetus the result of a mere interaction between the spermatozoa and ovum. The various differences associated with the stages of foetal development claimed by these philosophers do not seem to change the fact that a foetus resides in its mother’s womb; it is thence likened to a tumour in a fertile woman’s body and can therefore be expected to be considered nothing more than a new growth of cells until its birth. If the removal of a tumour, whether malignant or benign, requires no moral presupposition and is purely based on the patient’s decision in consultation with her doctor, then a decision to abort or not should similarly not invite any moral discourse. Abortion is amoral.
The most obvious physical aspect we can observe is the very fact that a foetus is nursed and nurtured in its mother’s body. This special and apparently parasitic relationship seems to imply that the foetus is still very much a part of the mother in so far as there is no way to exclude it and to speak of it as a separate entity. The mother cannot voluntarily and willfully choose to pause or terminate the nurturing process without aborting the pregnancy completely. It is this special physical relationship that makes it problematic to accord equal rights to both mother and foetus as two separate entities for the mother’s rights are often at odds with the foetus.’ Take for example a case whereby keeping the foetus endangers the life of the mother. Just as the general intuition of removing a malignant tumour invites no moral controversies, the removal of that very foetus which threatens the life of its mother should be treated likewise. However, if we were to accord the foetus the same kind of right to life as we accord to other human beings, we expose ourselves to the susceptibility of being compelled to preserve the life of the foetus and allow the degeneration of the mother’s health, even if it means that we lose both the mother and the foetus in the process. Even if we were to accede to the highly contestable view of according the foetus a right to life, we must not forget that ‘having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body – even if one needs it for life itself.’ There should never be a question on morality especially when the life of the mother is at stake.
The discussions have thus far been primarily focused on the foetus. We have tried to accord them with pertinent characteristics so as to argue for giving them the right to life. The morality of abortion then stems from whether they qualify for the criteria or not. I urge that we should not forget the role and responsibility of the mother in our discourse because she is very much the main character, even more so than her foetus. Many have failed to recognize that by compelling a woman to carry and nourish a foetus she does not want, constitutes committing a moral wrong to the mother. It is one thing to be constrained by divine restrictions which she has no control over but quite another to be forced by her fellow human beings. Mothers, the de facto primary caregivers, are the closest person to their foetuses. They are most aware of the reality and overall circumstance of their particular predicament. There should be no doubt that they have nothing but the foetus’ best interest at heart and would do nothing morally wrong if they can help it. I am therefore in support of granting the mother of the foetus the strongest vote in the making of decisions regarding the fate of her foetus because she remains the closest link to the foetus as it is after all still part of her. Unless it can be proven that the mother is unfit and incapable of rational and reasonable thought, she remains the best person to decide. Only in cases where a mother is suspected to be irrational, emotionally unstable and lacking in mental capacities should it be intervened on the basis of morality.
Thompson’s claim that a foetus cannot be considered a person right from the onset of conception further reinforces my view that since it is not considered a person, an abortion can hardly be comparable to the generally agreed morally wrong act of murdering a person. Moreover, the notion of abortion being considered murdering an innocent human foetal life is not only culturally generated, but also seems to be more of a construct of the Catholic Church and often with a religious tinge. Such conditions seem to suggest that abortion being thought of as morally wrong is not as pervasive and is not universally accepted amongst all of mankind in all recorded history.
Infants are very much likened to fetuses; in fact, there are no physical and cognitive differences between late-term fetuses except for its physical location. An infant, like a foetus, has no concept of a self as opined by Tooley. If Tooley were right, then an infant has no right to life and killing it is not morally wrong. However, I disagree with this view and argue that an infant must surely be different to a foetus who has until now only managed to survive under the physical protection of its mother. For one, it has shown itself strong enough to survive the delivery and has proven itself to be truly viable in so far as it can consume and breathe on its own. So even though an infant is not yet self-aware, its social and relational aspects are fast developing. While it used to be a relationship between the mother and the foetus, and to a lesser degree its father, an infant now concerns family and friends. The sensory experience of having an individual someone to hold and to love contributes to making an infant more person-like and in my opinion, makes killing it morally wrong.
Contrary to Tooley’s claim that infants probably do not desire to continue to exist, I argue that we can witness the infant’s desire to continue living. While it may be tricky and difficult to observe a foetus’ desire to survive because it exists inside its mother’s body and is nourished primarily via the umbilical cord which it cannot willfully reject the nurturing process, we can easily observe an infant’s will to survive; it cries when it feels hungry and when it is sick. This seems to suggest that they do not feel comfortable and hence dislike that physical state of being. A more extreme thought experiment that does not require actual execution would be to restrict the inhalation of fresh air by the infant but careful not to suffocate it. I am sure that the infant will retaliate in some form or other, attesting to its will to survive. Besides the additional attributes that adds to the strength of qualifying an infant as a person, we should take today’s medical advances and social conditions into context; killing a healthy, viable infant can no longer be claimed that it is done in the infant’s own best interests.’ There even exists plentiful of other options such as adoption by deserving couples who are unable to conceive. Hence infanticide of the above mentioned “normal” kind would be likened to murder and is therefore morally wrong.
In contrast to abortion where I have claimed that it is relatively straight forward, the morality of infanticide does not seem so defined. While infanticide is generally morally wrong, I argue that some cases should be made permissible under special conditions. In cases where the unfortunate foetus is born with severe mental handicaps like anencephaly and Down’s syndrome, where they are unable to appreciate the social and relational aspects which I alluded to earlier in this essay, I find it justifiable to end it of its misery. Try for a moment to appreciate the situation from the point of view of the infant; imagine a life of ostracism and weird stares from insensitive bystanders while growing up, great difficulties in common everyday activities and a burden to its family’s financial well-being. Even if we were to grant that the affected infant were to grow up to be slightly aware despite being severely mentally handicapped, I am of the view that he will agree that living a life as such will never be happier than compared to an average, healthy contemporary. Tooley’s idea of increasing the happiness level of society from discriminate infanticide seems callous at first, but on scrutiny, I believe it can be empathised. It is understandable that the parents find it devastating and will no doubt be burdened by the guilt of having come to such a decision, but I appeal for parents to look beyond the immediate loss and find peace and reassurance in knowing that they have acted in their infant’s best interests, and trust that the infant will be in a better place, living a happier life than a life of disability. So long as the reasons for infanticide are valid and the decision made shortly after birth, infanticide should be morally acceptable.
Parents who are so unfortunate to have to decide to end the life of their infant so shortly after death must surely be aware of the gravity of the situation; that it is a life that they are contemplating to end. Painful and difficult deliberations must have ensued upon the knowledge of such dire disabilities in their beloved infant whom the mother has so painstakingly carried to term for nine months. How then can we, as independent observers, not give them the benefit of the doubt that they are not doing this for fun, and that it affects them in manifold magnitudes? While few would agree that infanticide will be considered the least tragic of all other alternatives against the advances of medical science today, we cannot rule out the possible predicament of people who live in impoverished conditions. In the case where the infant is born in a land plagued by acute famine, infanticide via quick and painless methods would be more moral than allowing the infant to live now and suffer the slow and painful death of hunger. With medical sciences so advanced today, and with all forms of infanticide immoral, there might be a possibility where earth’s resources can no longer cater for and sustain the increase in human population if we were to take things to the extreme. When the rest of the world’s population suffers from inadequate food supplies and malnourishment, the moral wrongness inflicted to the sheer number of people surely outweighs the moral wrongness inflicted upon comparatively smaller numbers of people.
Through this essay, I hope to have expressed my view that there is nothing morally wrong with abortions because the foetus is not human in so far as it does not possess the ability of what Tooley claims it as conceiving of itself as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states. I also appealed to the analogy that a foetus is just like a tumour that resides in its mother’s womb and therefore its removal should not invite any moral controversies; it is amoral. On the other hand, the indiscriminate killing of infants is morally wrong, even though a newly born infant is arguably no different from a foetus except for its location and relational aspects. I find it immoral, on the contrary to abortions, because an infant possesses the capability to bond with more people than just the mother, the additional quality of an infant that surpasses a foetus in the question of morality. Nevertheless, there are some instances where decisions to terminate the life of an infant are morally permissible; these decisions however, should be made soon after birth and only if it serves to reduce the amount of harm and suffering of the infant.
Word count: 2480
Reference:
Michael Tooley, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 37-65
Mary Anne Warren, ‘The Moral Significance of Birth’, Hypatia, vol. 4, no. 3, 1989, pp. 46-65
Judith Jarvis Thompson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (1971). Reprinted in Rachels, Moral Problems, Second Ed., pp. 104-120
Rosalind Petchesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice, (Longman, N.Y. 1984), ch. 9
Lomansky, Loren. ‘Being a Person – does it matter?’, The Problem of Abortion, Joel Feinberg, ed. Belmont, California, 1984
decent folks
whenever someone asks "where can i find good men/women?" my general answer is usually the library.
i now recommend a new place which many find unlikely - carparks.
a fren was picked up in a carpark and they ended up in marriage! how encouraging...
i wish them eternal bliss.
i now recommend a new place which many find unlikely - carparks.
a fren was picked up in a carpark and they ended up in marriage! how encouraging...
i wish them eternal bliss.
Sunday, September 07, 2008
Saturday, September 06, 2008
karma is real?
but i'm not sure if it's real cos we make it real by linking all the uncanny coincidences?
or is it real cos it's really real; 'coincidences' aren't so coincidental after all?
or is it real cos it's really real; 'coincidences' aren't so coincidental after all?
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