Q4. Is there a moral difference between abortion and infanticide? Discuss with special reference to the views of Michael Tooley and Mary Anne Warren.
This essay seeks to express my view that there is a moral difference between abortion and some cases of infanticide. An abortion is a termination of a pregnancy; the expulsion of the foetus while it is still in refuge in its mother’s body. I opine that a foetus should not be considered an individual being and therefore aborting it does not make it any more immoral than removing a tumour found in the mother’s body; it is not murder as many have claimed. In fact, I would argue to classify the decision on abortion under an amoral one because a foetus while nested in its mother’s womb does not have the quality that entitles it to the right to life. Infanticide as a whole is prima facie immoral; but there are cases which ought not to be considered immoral and thereby be permitted under these unforeseen circumstances, especially so if they are decided early. This apparent double standard arises primarily from the fact that the foetus has already been born and it is now a separate entity, making it fall into a more complicated category by virtue that it is now a truly viable life form, independent of its mother and quickly capable of relational and social bonding. Infanticide should therefore be morally permissible under these special circumstances which I will attempt to elucidate. For the purpose of the discussion in this essay, a mother is assumed to be a normal, rational woman who harbours the best interest for the foetus and infant.
Many philosophers have attempted to make a distinction between the stages of: conception, the acquiring of human form, sentience, quickening, viability and birth, by attributing specific qualities to the various stages. They have appealed to these unique characteristics in their argument in their quest of ascertaining a cut-off point; an invisible line that can be drawn in which we can safely claim that abortion of a foetus before this point is not morally wrong. Unfortunately they have faced great difficulties as it seems that all the arguments put forward have their associated weaknesses and problems. It seems then that we need something more intrinsic in nature; an attribute that is less arbitrary and one which we can observe and ascertain with greater ease. I appeal to Michael Tooley’s argument that in order to accord something a serious right to life, it has to possess the ability to comprehend the ‘concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believe that it is itself such a continuing entity.’ A foetus therefore does not possess the property that entitles it the serious right to life; an abortion should not be morally wrong.
Mary Anne Warren’s view that the only stage that makes a morally significant difference ought to be at birth, albeit not flawless, appeals to me as the most plausible proposition. I consider a foetus the result of a mere interaction between the spermatozoa and ovum. The various differences associated with the stages of foetal development claimed by these philosophers do not seem to change the fact that a foetus resides in its mother’s womb; it is thence likened to a tumour in a fertile woman’s body and can therefore be expected to be considered nothing more than a new growth of cells until its birth. If the removal of a tumour, whether malignant or benign, requires no moral presupposition and is purely based on the patient’s decision in consultation with her doctor, then a decision to abort or not should similarly not invite any moral discourse. Abortion is amoral.
The most obvious physical aspect we can observe is the very fact that a foetus is nursed and nurtured in its mother’s body. This special and apparently parasitic relationship seems to imply that the foetus is still very much a part of the mother in so far as there is no way to exclude it and to speak of it as a separate entity. The mother cannot voluntarily and willfully choose to pause or terminate the nurturing process without aborting the pregnancy completely. It is this special physical relationship that makes it problematic to accord equal rights to both mother and foetus as two separate entities for the mother’s rights are often at odds with the foetus.’ Take for example a case whereby keeping the foetus endangers the life of the mother. Just as the general intuition of removing a malignant tumour invites no moral controversies, the removal of that very foetus which threatens the life of its mother should be treated likewise. However, if we were to accord the foetus the same kind of right to life as we accord to other human beings, we expose ourselves to the susceptibility of being compelled to preserve the life of the foetus and allow the degeneration of the mother’s health, even if it means that we lose both the mother and the foetus in the process. Even if we were to accede to the highly contestable view of according the foetus a right to life, we must not forget that ‘having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body – even if one needs it for life itself.’ There should never be a question on morality especially when the life of the mother is at stake.
The discussions have thus far been primarily focused on the foetus. We have tried to accord them with pertinent characteristics so as to argue for giving them the right to life. The morality of abortion then stems from whether they qualify for the criteria or not. I urge that we should not forget the role and responsibility of the mother in our discourse because she is very much the main character, even more so than her foetus. Many have failed to recognize that by compelling a woman to carry and nourish a foetus she does not want, constitutes committing a moral wrong to the mother. It is one thing to be constrained by divine restrictions which she has no control over but quite another to be forced by her fellow human beings. Mothers, the de facto primary caregivers, are the closest person to their foetuses. They are most aware of the reality and overall circumstance of their particular predicament. There should be no doubt that they have nothing but the foetus’ best interest at heart and would do nothing morally wrong if they can help it. I am therefore in support of granting the mother of the foetus the strongest vote in the making of decisions regarding the fate of her foetus because she remains the closest link to the foetus as it is after all still part of her. Unless it can be proven that the mother is unfit and incapable of rational and reasonable thought, she remains the best person to decide. Only in cases where a mother is suspected to be irrational, emotionally unstable and lacking in mental capacities should it be intervened on the basis of morality.
Thompson’s claim that a foetus cannot be considered a person right from the onset of conception further reinforces my view that since it is not considered a person, an abortion can hardly be comparable to the generally agreed morally wrong act of murdering a person. Moreover, the notion of abortion being considered murdering an innocent human foetal life is not only culturally generated, but also seems to be more of a construct of the Catholic Church and often with a religious tinge. Such conditions seem to suggest that abortion being thought of as morally wrong is not as pervasive and is not universally accepted amongst all of mankind in all recorded history.
Infants are very much likened to fetuses; in fact, there are no physical and cognitive differences between late-term fetuses except for its physical location. An infant, like a foetus, has no concept of a self as opined by Tooley. If Tooley were right, then an infant has no right to life and killing it is not morally wrong. However, I disagree with this view and argue that an infant must surely be different to a foetus who has until now only managed to survive under the physical protection of its mother. For one, it has shown itself strong enough to survive the delivery and has proven itself to be truly viable in so far as it can consume and breathe on its own. So even though an infant is not yet self-aware, its social and relational aspects are fast developing. While it used to be a relationship between the mother and the foetus, and to a lesser degree its father, an infant now concerns family and friends. The sensory experience of having an individual someone to hold and to love contributes to making an infant more person-like and in my opinion, makes killing it morally wrong.
Contrary to Tooley’s claim that infants probably do not desire to continue to exist, I argue that we can witness the infant’s desire to continue living. While it may be tricky and difficult to observe a foetus’ desire to survive because it exists inside its mother’s body and is nourished primarily via the umbilical cord which it cannot willfully reject the nurturing process, we can easily observe an infant’s will to survive; it cries when it feels hungry and when it is sick. This seems to suggest that they do not feel comfortable and hence dislike that physical state of being. A more extreme thought experiment that does not require actual execution would be to restrict the inhalation of fresh air by the infant but careful not to suffocate it. I am sure that the infant will retaliate in some form or other, attesting to its will to survive. Besides the additional attributes that adds to the strength of qualifying an infant as a person, we should take today’s medical advances and social conditions into context; killing a healthy, viable infant can no longer be claimed that it is done in the infant’s own best interests.’ There even exists plentiful of other options such as adoption by deserving couples who are unable to conceive. Hence infanticide of the above mentioned “normal” kind would be likened to murder and is therefore morally wrong.
In contrast to abortion where I have claimed that it is relatively straight forward, the morality of infanticide does not seem so defined. While infanticide is generally morally wrong, I argue that some cases should be made permissible under special conditions. In cases where the unfortunate foetus is born with severe mental handicaps like anencephaly and Down’s syndrome, where they are unable to appreciate the social and relational aspects which I alluded to earlier in this essay, I find it justifiable to end it of its misery. Try for a moment to appreciate the situation from the point of view of the infant; imagine a life of ostracism and weird stares from insensitive bystanders while growing up, great difficulties in common everyday activities and a burden to its family’s financial well-being. Even if we were to grant that the affected infant were to grow up to be slightly aware despite being severely mentally handicapped, I am of the view that he will agree that living a life as such will never be happier than compared to an average, healthy contemporary. Tooley’s idea of increasing the happiness level of society from discriminate infanticide seems callous at first, but on scrutiny, I believe it can be empathised. It is understandable that the parents find it devastating and will no doubt be burdened by the guilt of having come to such a decision, but I appeal for parents to look beyond the immediate loss and find peace and reassurance in knowing that they have acted in their infant’s best interests, and trust that the infant will be in a better place, living a happier life than a life of disability. So long as the reasons for infanticide are valid and the decision made shortly after birth, infanticide should be morally acceptable.
Parents who are so unfortunate to have to decide to end the life of their infant so shortly after death must surely be aware of the gravity of the situation; that it is a life that they are contemplating to end. Painful and difficult deliberations must have ensued upon the knowledge of such dire disabilities in their beloved infant whom the mother has so painstakingly carried to term for nine months. How then can we, as independent observers, not give them the benefit of the doubt that they are not doing this for fun, and that it affects them in manifold magnitudes? While few would agree that infanticide will be considered the least tragic of all other alternatives against the advances of medical science today, we cannot rule out the possible predicament of people who live in impoverished conditions. In the case where the infant is born in a land plagued by acute famine, infanticide via quick and painless methods would be more moral than allowing the infant to live now and suffer the slow and painful death of hunger. With medical sciences so advanced today, and with all forms of infanticide immoral, there might be a possibility where earth’s resources can no longer cater for and sustain the increase in human population if we were to take things to the extreme. When the rest of the world’s population suffers from inadequate food supplies and malnourishment, the moral wrongness inflicted to the sheer number of people surely outweighs the moral wrongness inflicted upon comparatively smaller numbers of people.
Through this essay, I hope to have expressed my view that there is nothing morally wrong with abortions because the foetus is not human in so far as it does not possess the ability of what Tooley claims it as conceiving of itself as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states. I also appealed to the analogy that a foetus is just like a tumour that resides in its mother’s womb and therefore its removal should not invite any moral controversies; it is amoral. On the other hand, the indiscriminate killing of infants is morally wrong, even though a newly born infant is arguably no different from a foetus except for its location and relational aspects. I find it immoral, on the contrary to abortions, because an infant possesses the capability to bond with more people than just the mother, the additional quality of an infant that surpasses a foetus in the question of morality. Nevertheless, there are some instances where decisions to terminate the life of an infant are morally permissible; these decisions however, should be made soon after birth and only if it serves to reduce the amount of harm and suffering of the infant.
Word count: 2480
Reference:
Michael Tooley, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 37-65
Mary Anne Warren, ‘The Moral Significance of Birth’, Hypatia, vol. 4, no. 3, 1989, pp. 46-65
Judith Jarvis Thompson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (1971). Reprinted in Rachels, Moral Problems, Second Ed., pp. 104-120
Rosalind Petchesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice, (Longman, N.Y. 1984), ch. 9
Lomansky, Loren. ‘Being a Person – does it matter?’, The Problem of Abortion, Joel Feinberg, ed. Belmont, California, 1984
